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Abstract 
 
 India has now crossed the threshold into Middle Income Status. It is a nuclear 
power and has a space program. It has announced the formation of an agency to coordinate 
its aid donor activities. And yet India is the recipient of international aid as well. Can this 
configuration, on the face of it absurd, nevertheless make sense? This paper explores 
frameworks in which a Middle Income Country might go on receiving aid despite having 
crossed a poverty threshold on average. It begins with a discussion of “Global 
Rawlsianism” and its critics, most prominently Rawls himself, and assesses the moral 
salience of national level averages in determining global responsibility towards the poor in 
a country. The next section takes the perspective of global poverty minimization and 
discusses the allocation of global aid with the objective of poverty alleviation, and whether 
in this context it might make sense for a country to be a donor and a recipient of aid. 
Finally, the paper takes an operational perspective and discusses some of the key issues 
facing the international community in the next few years, including the nature of the 
replenishment of IDA, the World Bank’s concessional assistance window. 
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1. Introduction 
Can a country be a recipient and a donor of development assistance? If the question 
is read in simple factual terms the answer is clearly yes and that is the end of the story. 
China, India and many developing countries have been and are recipients and donors of 
aid. So the phenomenon exists. The deeper question is what issues this raises for the moral 
case for development assistance, and what it means for the operational rules of 
development assistance. The object of this paper is to raise these issues and to frame an 
analytical discussion around questions and processes which would otherwise be primarily 
political in nature. 
 
 It turns out that the case of India is pivotal in the current discourse. The country has 
just crossed into the status of a Middle Income Country (MIC), using official World Bank 
classifications. It has also crossed the per capita income threshold for eligibility for the 
World Bank’s concessional loans window (IDA). Two decades of high growth have 
brought the country into prominence in global economic circles, including membership of 
country groupings such as the G20, BRICS, etc. Its quest for a permanent seat on the 
United Nations Security Council has been given new impetus by its economic successes. It 
is of course a nuclear power, and has a space program, with significant portion of public 
expenditure going these endeavors. Further, India’s aid program to even poorer countries is 
now sufficiently on the radar screen that an aid agency is being formed to coordinate Indian 
aid efforts.  
 
And yet, India has around 400 million poor people, using the official World Bank 
global poverty line. This disconnect between the performance and perception of the country 
on average, and the reality of poverty for huge numbers of individuals in the country has 
led to considerable soul searching among aid donors and among the Indian policy making 
elite. Many bilateral donors, including some Nordic countries, have suspended their aid 
programs to India. The former colonial power, Britain, has been agonizing over what to do. 
Sending aid to a country whose multinationals are buying up factories in the UK does not 
sit well with the taxpaying public, especially in fiscally straightened times. And the fact 
that India has its own aid program makes aid to India a difficult political sell to the British 
public. The current compromise is that British aid will continue, but will focus on the 
poorest states in India where national poverty is concentrated. 
 
The Indian policy making elite is similarly conflicted. There appear to be three 
groupings among senior bureaucrats and opinion makers. One group is focused on India’s 
new global status as a member of G20 and finds it perhaps demeaning for India to been 
seeing going “cap in hand” to donors, especially to the former colonial power. A second 
group is focused on the widespread poverty in India despite its MIC status, and is on the 
lookout for resources to address these issues. There is also, perhaps, a third group of 
pragmatists who are focused on fungibility of resources and are willing to cultivate access 
to concessional funds provided India’s geopolitical objectives are not too severely affected. 
These three tendencies in Indian policy making are currently struggling over whether and 
how to maintain India’s access to IDA despite the fact that according to the current rules of 
access India will “graduate” soon from this facility. And this is the mirror image of the 
discussion at the global level among the IDA donors about the politics in their domestic 
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constituencies of changing the rules of IDA so as to continue India’s access to these 
concessional funds. 
 
These political currents--the perceptions of the taxpaying public in donor countries 
and the self-image of Indian elites—will eventually determine the future of aid to India. 
This paper, however, provides a more analytical focus on the issues raised by the current 
discourse. Section 2 begins with a discussion of the moral salience of national level 
averages in determining global responsibility towards the poor in a country, in the context 
of an ongoing discussion in political philosophy on “Global Rawlsianism.” Then Section 3 
takes the perspective of global poverty minimization and discusses the allocation of global 
aid with the objective of poverty alleviation, and whether in this context it might make 
sense for a country to be a donor and a recipient of aid. Finally, in Section 4 the paper takes 
a specific operational perspective and discusses some of the key issues facing the 
international community in the next few years on IDA, the World Bank’s concessional 
assistance window. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Salience of the Nation State:  Global Rawlsians versus Rawls 
The crossing into MIC status can be seen in a broad sense as India on average 
having crossed the global poverty line.1 But many millions of Indians are indeed below the 
global poverty line. If there is a moral responsibility for nations who are above the poverty 
line to help those below the line, does this responsibility extend only to nations that are 
below the poverty line, or to individuals below the line even if they live in a nation that has 
crossed the line? Many responses from northern publics in the raw political discourse are of 
the type--“these countries should take care of their own poor now that they have the 
resources to do so, our responsibility stopped when the country crossed into middle income 
status.” In fact, it turns out that the political discourse is related to an ongoing debate in 
political philosophy on the nature of global justice. 
 
Let us start with the standard “Rawlsian maximin”, whereby policy should be 
directed towards improving the wellbeing of the worst off in society. The simplified 
justification of this is the thought experiment of the “veil of ignorance”. If individuals were 
deciding whether or not to accede to one of a range of policy packages but they did not 
know where they themselves would end up, it is argued that there would be support for the 
package which focused on the wellbeing of the worst off, because each individual could be 
that person. I realize of course that this is a highly simplified account of Rawls’s A Theory 
of Justice (Rawls, 1971), but it follows Arrow’s (1973) interpretation of the Rawlsian 
argument for economists. If this argument were applied to the global level, such “Global 
Rawlsianism” would mean that at the global level the focus would be on the least well off, 
no matter where they were. In particular, the fact that the least well off lived in a nation that 
was in middle income status would not have any moral significance.2 However, such a 
position has been critiqued by a range of political philosophers, not least Rawls himself in a 
series of arguments culminating in The Law of Peoples (Rawls, 1999). In what follows, this 
                                                 
1 Of course there are a number of technical issues involved here in terms of the different methods of 
constructing individual poverty lines and the per capital income thresholds which define MIC status. 
2 It can of course have operational significance—this will be taken up in the next section. 
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debate on Global Justice is reviewed and assessed to provide an analytical background to 
the issue of aid to countries like India. 
 
In a masterful exposition from which I have learnt a lot, Nagel (2005, pp. 114-115) 
states the basic set of questions as follows: 
 
“The issue of justice and equality is posed with particular clarity by one of the 
controversies between Rawls and his critics. Rawls argued that the liberal requirements of 
justice include a strong component of equality among citizens, but that this is a specifically 
political demand, which applies to the basic structure of a unified nation-state. It does not 
apply to the personal (nonpolitical) choices of individuals living in such a society, nor does 
it apply to the relations between one society and another, or between the members of 
different societies. Egalitarian justice is a requirement on the internal political, economic, 
and social structure of nation-states and cannot be extrapolated to different contexts, which 
require different standards. This issue is independent of the specific standards of egalitarian 
justice found in Rawls’s theory. Whatever standards of equal rights or equal opportunity 
apply domestically, the question is whether consistency requires that they also apply 
globally.” 
 
The line of argument in Rawls (1999) can be traced back to Hobbes in Leviathan, 
that it is in return for conceding their powers to the sovereign that the citizenry can make 
demands on the operation of the sovereign. Among these is economic justice, focusing on 
the least well off.  This framework can be seen to apply, however imperfectly, at the level 
of the nation state. But it is argued that it self-evidently does not apply at the global level. 
 
Contrary to the above argument, which Nagel (2005) labels “the political 
conception,” the alternative conception of “cosmopolitanism” argues from the basis of 
equal concern and duty that is owed to all human beings. This argument has been advanced 
for example by Singer (2002), Pogge (1989) and Beitz (1979). In this view, “it would be 
morally inconsistent not to wish, for the world as a whole, a common system of institutions 
that could attempt to realize the same standards of fairness or equal opportunity that one 
wants for one’s own society. The accident of being born in a poor rather than a rich country 
is as arbitrary a determinant of one’s fate as the accident of being born into a poor rather 
than a rich family in the same country.” (Nagel, 2005, p. 119).  
 
Nagel (2005, p. 126) says that he finds “the choice between these two incompatible 
moral conceptions difficult.”  On one view, the right moral unit is the individual 
irrespective of which nation state they belong to. In a related set of arguments, Rawls and 
his followers would reject such “monism” and argue that there cannot be a single regulative 
principle for all moral questions. The Rawlsian maximin applies to relations between 
individuals as they relate to a sovereign state but not, for example, to moral relations 
between individuals, and certainly not to moral relations between nation states. Rawls 
would consider it illegitimate to extend his theorizing from the nation state to the global 
stage. 
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My Cornell colleague Richard Miller (2011) has recently addressed the issue of 
cosmopolitanism and its tensions with a nation state based view. My interpretation of this 
important contribution to the debate is that Miller rejects both extremes. On the one hand 
he questions the Singer view that closeness along different dimensions (for example, 
family, community or nation) should have no moral salience whatever—that, for example, 
a well off person in a developed country has duty of equal concern for her daughter and the 
poor in developing countries. On the other hand, he also argues that individuals in a nation 
can indeed have some moral responsibility to individuals in another nation because of the 
relations between the two states. The argument turns on whether relations between nations 
are themselves exploitative. Miller (2011) argues that arrangements in world trade, in the 
global financial architecture and more generally in economic arrangements benefit wealthy 
nations and thus individuals in those nations. This then leads to a moral responsibility on 
the part of those individuals to work to remove these forms of exploitation, and to redress 
their consequences. To the extent that nation-to-nation aid constitutes such redress, it has 
moral justification. 
 
Although I am drawn strongly to the cosmopolitan view, I recognize that there are 
strong counterarguments. For example, within a country there are regions and regional 
identities. The question then arises as to whether a regional development policy which aims 
to minimize poverty should do so even if it means depopulating a region and thereby 
extinguishing that regional identity. In fact, most countries have regional policies that 
direct investment and development into regions even when this may not be the most 
efficient outcome for poverty reduction at the national level. In such situations, I tend to 
have sympathy with a policy that attempts to “move jobs to the people” rather than “move 
people to the jobs.”  At the international level, however, such migration is not allowed or at 
least is not extensive. Thus we are back to the question whether once a nation crosses the 
poverty line on average, global responsibility to the poor in that country ceases. The 
Rawlsian argument would be that this responsibility did not exist in the first place. The 
cosmopolitan argument would be that the responsibility continues so long as any poverty 
persists in any country. The Miller argument would be more nuanced, looking to find 
patterns of exploitation as the building block of moral responsibility. In what follows I 
assume that responsibility endures. But the national level performance might nevertheless 
be a useful indicator in determining aid flows.  
 
3. Global Poverty Minimization and Anti-Poverty Targeting3 
 
Suppose a donor nation, or a collectivity of donors nations as in the case of IDA, 
were interested in minimizing global poverty irrespective of where it occurs. How should 
they allocate their resources between nations of differing per capita incomes? The answer 
to this question depends on a more detailed specification of donor objectives, and on an 
elaboration of how aid leads to poverty reduction in different countries. On objectives, let 
us think specifically of the well known Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) family of 
poverty indices Pα . When α = 0, we have the simple head count ratio or incidence of 
poverty. When α = 1 we have the poverty gap measure which is the normalized sum of 
                                                 
3 The arguments in this section draw on Kanbur and Sumner (2011) 
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gaps between the poverty line and incomes below the poverty line. When α = 2 we have the 
squared poverty gap measure which gives greater weight to the poorest among the poor. 
 
To fix ideas, let us think of aid simply as increasing the purchasing power of 
individuals in countries to which it is directed. The channels through which this happens, 
and the efficiency of aid in reaching the poor, will be taken up presently. If donors could 
perfectly target their transfers to the poor, then the nation state would indeed be 
irrelevant—aid should flow to the poor to minimize global poverty. For α = 0 this would be 
the poor who were closest to the global poverty line, no matter in which nation they lived. 
Of course, if there was a nation where the poor were concentrated closest to the global 
poverty line, this nation would receive most aid, but this would only be a side effect of the 
policy, not its essence.  For α = 1 it would not matter which of the global poor the aid 
flowed to—the donors would be indifferent as between the poor and therefore as between 
the nation states.  For α = 2, aid should flow to the poorest of the poor, no matter where 
they are. If it so happens that they are concentrated in a particular nation, then aid will flow 
there, but again as a side consequence. For example if it is the case that the poorest nations 
have the poorest of the global poor, this policy will direct most aid to the poorest nations, 
and will reduce and may even cut off assistance as per capita income rises in a recipient 
country. But this will be the natural consequence of a cosmopolitan policy in these 
circumstances—it will not be an expression of a view that beyond a certain point the nation 
state will have to take responsibility for its own poor. 
 
With this highly stylized setting we can now pose the analytical question, could a 
country be a recipient and a donor of aid? The answer depends on their being different 
objective functions between different countries as donors. If all countries had as their 
objective the poorest of the poor, then if a country received aid because it had the poorest 
of the poor in the world, then it should spend its own aid resources also on its own people, 
so we could not have a country being both a recipient and a donor. On the other hand, if α = 
1 so that the objective function was indifferent as to which of the poor received assistance, 
then we could indeed have a situation of a country receiving and giving aid as the rational 
outcome of the aid allocation process, but this would only be for this “knife-edge” case. 
 
If, however, the objective function of global aid and national aid differed in the 
values of α, then one can see that a country could indeed be a recipient and a donor of aid 
given particular configurations of global poverty. For example, if the global objective 
function was α = 2 and the poorest of the poor in the world were concentrated in the 
country under focus, then global aid would flow to this country. But if the objective 
function of this country was less poverty averse, say with a value of α = 0, then aid from 
this country would flow to elsewhere in the world. Hence this country would be both a 
recipient and donor of aid. 
 
All of the above is when perfect targeting is possible directly from the donors to the 
poor. Let us now move to the case where this is not possible. The flow of aid is now to the 
recipient government, which then distributes the aid on to its population. This is in fact the 
actual state of affairs in the global aid architecture. Analytically, everything now depends 
on how exactly the recipient country distributes the aid it receives (and of course on the 
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donor’s objective function). Let us start with the assumption of no onward targeting—in 
other words, the aid is distributed equally among the populace of the recipient country.4 It 
has been shown that faced with this situation if the objective is to minimize global Pα the 
donor should target aid to the country with the highest Pα-15. Thus if the objective is P2 the 
aid should be targeted to countries with the highest P1, and if the objective is P1 then the 
target should be countries with highest P0.6 
 
With the above framework, if poverty falls with per capita income then there is an 
argument for reducing aid to countries with higher per capita incomes. But this relies on a 
presumed empirical regularity. Even if there were strong evidence for the relationship, 
which there is, it would be better to base the criterion for aid flow directly on poverty in the 
country rather than per capita income. At the very least this would allow us to distinguish 
between differential movements in P1 and P2 if any. Still in this framework, could a country 
be a recipient and a donor? If the global donor and the recipient have the same objective 
function and the same model of how aid flows to the economy (every individual gets an 
equal amount), then the recipient from the global donor could not itself be a donor to other 
countries, since both would target their resources to the country with the highest Pα-1. 
However, if the objectives of the global donor and the recipient differed, for example if 
they had different α’s, then analytically it is possible for the global donor to give aid to a 
recipient country and for the recipient country to use its own resources to give aid to 
another country. 
 
So far we have assumed that the model of how aid flows to the poor in a country is 
the same for all countries. But this is clearly not the case. There are efficiency differences 
in how some countries are able to use aid. One way to represent this analytically is to treat 
an aid flow of A as an effective flow of eA, where e is an efficiency parameter. And there 
are targeting differences. Some countries target aid to the poorest better than others. If the 
objective of a donor is to minimize global poverty Pα then aid should be targeted to 
countries with (i) higher Pα-1, (ii) higher e, and (iii) better targeting to the poor. The key 
point, however, is that per capita income does not enter this calculation at all, except once 
again in terms of an empirical regularity between it and (i), (ii) and (iii). Rather than rely on 
this, it would be better to rely directly on indicators of the efficacy of aid in reducing 
poverty. 
 
Finally, could a country be a recipient and a donor in this expanded framework? 
The answer depends on the interpretation of the efficiency parameter e, and a more detailed 
consideration of how aid transforms itself into development and poverty reduction. Up to 
now we have simply taken a “cash transfer” perspective. But much of aid is transfer of 
specific knowledge and expertise in different sectors ranging from agriculture, through 
infrastructure, to social sectors. With this broader perspective it is quite possible that 
countries may have different types of expertise. As The Economist (August 13, 2011) notes 
in its assessment: 
                                                 
4 This could happen, for example, if the aid was used to finance subsidies to food and fuel rations to the 
population in a country. 
5 Kanbur (1987) 
6 The analysis is more complicated if the objective is minimization of P0. 
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“…like trade, aid benefits from specialisation and comparative advantage. 
Emerging countries, with recent experience to draw upon, might do a better job of 
infrastructure spending. The West should focus more on policies and good governance 
(something many poorer Indian states are crying out for).” 
 
To summarize, a global poverty minimization framework, with the objective of 
minimizing global poverty no matter where it occurs, can nevertheless lead to a key role for 
the nation state as a mediator between donors and the poor. Depending on donor objectives 
and on the constraints faced in reaching the poor, various national level indicators can be 
useful in targeting development assistance to different countries. These include poverty in 
the country, and indicators the efficiency of aid use in the country. Per capita income can 
be useful as a correlate of these indicators, but does not emerge in and of itself as the sole 
criterion for cutting countries off from development assistance.  
 
4. Some Operational Considerations: The Case of IDA7 
The political, conceptual, philosophical and analytical issues covered in the paper 
so far all come together in an issue that is at the forefront of policy discourse right now—
the rules of access to IDA, the World Bank’s concessional loans window. Unlike the IBRD 
part of the World Bank Group, which makes loans to richer developing countries at market 
rates from funds raised in the market, IDA is a fund to which donors contribute, and from 
which highly concessional loans are made to the poorest countries. According IDA rules, 
repayments go back into the IDA pool. Donors meet every three years to agree on their new 
contributions to the pool. The three year cycle is known as a “replenishment.” We are 
currently in the middle of the 16th replenishment, IDA16.  
 
In 2012 the cutoff for eligibility for IDA funds is gross national income per capita 
of $1,175.8 The threshold is updated for inflation every year. Operationally, when a country 
exceeds the threshold for three years in a row it “graduates” and can no longer get new 
loans from IDA. Further, at graduation a country’s repayment terms on outstanding loans 
harden. In simple terms, whatever principal was due to be repaid on the old repayment 
schedule now doubles—in other words, the maturity of the outstanding debt halves. Thus 
countries face a significant penalty as they cross the threshold. However, the logic behind 
graduation is that these countries should now be able to address their poverty problems 
without assistance from IDA, thereby releasing funds for even poorer countries. Obviously 
this logic rests on an assumed close connection between poor countries and poor people. 
 
The link between poor countries and poor people has been weakening. Twenty 
years ago, 90% of the world’s poor lived in officially classified Low income Countries 
(LICs). Today around three quarters of the world’s poor live in MICs. This is not just a 
“China and India” phenomenon. A number of large MICs (Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, 
Philippines, etc.) together account for as many poor as China (Kanbur and Sumner, 2011). 
The phenomenon has crept upon us because of the fast growth of these populous countries. 
                                                 
7 This section draws on Kanbur (2012). 
8This is slightly different from the MIC threshold. A country crosses over to MIC status when its per capita 
income exceeds $1,025 (2011 threshold). 
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Growth has clearly reduced poverty, but not so fast that poverty is rendered insignificant as 
the countries cross into MIC status. The result is a very different geography of poverty 
compared to even two decades ago. 
 
Moss and Leo (2011) have conducted a detailed set of projections on the future of 
IDA if country growth patterns continue as in the past, and IDA rules of access remain 
unchanged. Using more conservative graduation assumptions (for example, five years 
continuously above the threshold in order to graduate) they nevertheless find dramatic 
patterns:  36 out of the current 68 eligible countries will graduate by 2025. The graduands 
include India, Vietnam, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya (Bangladesh will graduate by 
2029). These countries are currently the biggest recipients of IDA funds.  
 
The implications of this “business as usual” scenario are quite dramatic. Most 
importantly, while IDA will indeed focus on the poorest countries in the world, it will 
disengage from the bulk of the world’s poor. The countries that remain in IDA will receive 
a bonanza if donor flows continue into the pool. For example, Ethiopia would receive twice 
as much as its recent IDA commitments. Niger would receive an amount from IDA that 
was greater than its flows from all other current donors. There may well be absorptive 
capacity problems in these countries. But before that happens, donors may well “declare 
victory” and reduce their contributions to the IDA pool. Thus the remaining countries may 
not benefit greatly, but the graduated countries will lose funds to address their huge poverty 
problems. 
 
And it is the remaining poverty problems in MICs that are the strongest argument 
for continued development assistance to them. The case of India is well known. Depending 
on how exactly the calculations are done, around 400 million Indians are below the official 
global poverty line. The recent growth spurt has benefited some states but not others. Even 
in fast growing states some districts lag behind. And yet India has crossed the IDA 
threshold and is due to graduate from IDA within the next year or two. Does this make 
sense?  
 
I have argued (Kanbur, 2012) that if IDA is to not become disengaged from the 
bulk of the world’s poor, its rules of access will have to be changed. But changing the rules 
will not be easy. India is the test case. The countries that remain in IDA will see the threat 
to their funding from keeping India in IDA. Indian elites may themselves not be willing to 
accept aid. Donors will argue that in times of fiscal austerity they cannot support a MIC 
country. And, of course, they will raise the question of how aid can be continued to India 
when it is itself becoming an aid donor. 
 
All of these arguments will need to be countered. But even if these arguments are 
won there remain the detailed operational questions of exactly the rules of access to IDA 
will be changed. In Kanbur (2012, p. 6), I propose a second window for IDA: 
 
“Between the current IDA threshold and twice this threshold, IDA resources would 
be available for projects and interventions targeted specifically to the poor—for example 
through projects focused on regions whose per capita income is below the IDA threshold, 
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or through projects focused on sectors such as basic health and basic education which 
would reach the poorest of the poor.” 
 
A similar proposal is part of an overall package of IDA reforms recommended by 
Severino and Moss (2012). I argue that this proposal has several advantages, including the 
fact that it stays within the standard “per capita income thresholds” framework but within 
that it incorporates explicit targeting to the poor. However, changing IDA’s rules of access 
in this way will encounter a number of operational problems which will have to be 
addressed (Kanbur, 2012, p. 7): 
(1) “Exact delineation of poor regions or poverty oriented sectors. Regional per capita 
income could be used to target projects within a country. Only those regions that 
have not crossed the basic IDA threshold would be eligible. In India, for example, 
the poorest states would continue to have access to IDA until India’s per capita GNI 
exceeded twice the IDA threshold. But for implementation this would require 
strengthening of sub-national income accounts. 
(2) Performance based allocation for this window of IDA resources. Would the same 
allocation rules (based on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment—CPIA) 
apply? Or might modified performance indicators, focused directly on poverty 
reduction outcomes, be more appropriate? (For an argument in favor of strongly 
outcomes-based approaches, see Kanbur, 2005. See also Leo, 2010). 
(3) Some countries that have graduated but have not crossed the UMIC threshold will 
once again have access to IDA. Bringing these countries back into the IDA fold will 
require the appropriate reengagement, although of course there is IBRD 
engagement in any case. 
(4) On the funding side, the issue of how much should be allocated to the new window, 
and on what criteria, will need to be discussed and worked out. Can donors earmark 
their contributions for a window? Or would the overall replenishment be allocated 
according to operational needs and performance criteria? 
(5) More generally, governance structures for the new window, to which a limited 
number of MICs would have access, would need to be worked out.”  
These operational issues are important of course, but the fact that they can be 
specified in this way suggests that we can at least begin to address them. However, the 
more fundamental question is whether India should continue to have access to IDA. On 
analytical grounds, I have argued that the answer to this is yes. Ultimately, of course, the 
final outcome will depend on the politics among IDA donors and within India itself. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As I noted at the start, the simple factual answer to the question in the title of this 
paper is yes. It turns out that the answer to the deeper interpretation of the question is also 
yes, but in qualified manner. I have contrasted “cosmopolitanism”, which requires equal 
concern for the poor no matter which country they are in, with the “political conception”, 
which would imply in strong form that there is no moral responsibility of economic justice 
towards the poor of another country, or in a weak form would still imply that once a 
country crosses the poverty line on average global responsibility towards its poor citizens is 
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diminished or even finished. However, even with an objective of minimizing global 
poverty, national level indicators reappear in a targeting framework. But from the 
analytical perspective national per capita income is not one of these direct indicators, and 
appears only as their correlate—itself only a proxy for the relevant targeting indicators. 
However, per capita income thresholds are now well ensconced in the global aid 
architecture. In the specific operational context of IDA I have therefore argued for a second 
window beyond the current threshold, through which funds can be accessed only for 
interventions targeted to the poor. And this should happen even if a country has an aid 
program to countries that are poorer than itself.  
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